Explanation
Screening a holding against SFDR
Contribution, do no significant harm, good governance. Three tests, each with a figure, a limit or a reason you can point at. A walk through the Deck's SFDR page on an early-stage holding, and why a limit exceeded is the most useful thing it produces.
Valued before November 2026, when each pathway carried an additionality percentage. Results now value each pathway against its alternative where it has one, and show an absolute and an additional impact, as the net impact bridge explains.
Deciding whether a holding counts as a sustainable investment is a three-part test, and in practice only one part usually has numbers behind it. Contribution gets argued from the company's own reporting. Do no significant harm gets a vendor score and a paragraph. Good governance gets a memo. The position then goes into the fund and the reasoning sits in a file nobody reopens until an auditor asks.
The SFDR page of the Deck runs the three tests against a monetised impact model, so contribution and harm come with figures you can point at, and governance is named as the fund's own call. This walks through it on Nutris, an early-stage fava-bean protein producer with about 10.1 million dollars of revenue, screened for a fund whose stated objective is to regenerate biodiversity.
What the page gives you
Open the company in the Deck and pick SFDR among the Report pages beside the chat. Two things sit there, and they do different jobs.
The first assembles evidence, presenting the mandatory principal adverse impact indicators and marking where each figure has to come from. The second sets out the three tests of a sustainable investment. Neither classifies a product. Both work on a single holding, both read the year the year bar picks, and the fund-level judgement stays with the financial market participant. At a scenario year the page is stamped as projected and not for filing.
Reading the PAI table

Fourteen Table 1 indicators sit on seventeen rows, since greenhouse gas emissions split by scope and emissions to water by nutrient. Six rows are estimated from the release and labelled as proxies, one is fund data, and ten need company data.
The six proxy rows read straight from the published release with no generation involved. Greenhouse gas emissions come to 5,399 tonnes of CO2 equivalent, 1,797 for Scope 1 and 2 combined and 3,602 for Scope 3, intensity to 533 tonnes per million dollars of revenue, and emissions to water to 2.69 tonnes of phosphorus equivalent and 1.14 tonnes of nitrogen equivalent. The table follows the convention a filing needs. It counts emitted quantities only, and avoided emissions are never netted against them.
Each proxy row also carries its own caveat. Scope 1 and 2 are combined with electricity at grid averages, Scope 3 covers what the pathways model, and the water rows measure eutrophying emissions over the life cycle as a proxy for the tonnes of priority substances the indicator counts. Intensity is stated per million dollars where the indicator is stated per million euros. Those distinctions matter if a number is going anywhere near a disclosure.
Three kinds of gap
The rows without a figure look alike and are not.
Carbon footprint is fund data. The fund divides the attributed emissions of all its holdings by the current value of its investments, so the figure belongs to the portfolio rather than to the holding, and the model already supplies this holding's share of the numerator.
Biodiversity-sensitive areas needs company data, for a different reason. The model has 17.1 million PDF square-metre-years of terrestrial biodiversity pressure across the value chain, which is real evidence and sits on the CSRD page, but the regulation asks whether operations sit in or near a biodiversity-sensitive area. Pressure is not adjacency. No modelling closes that one, and the table says so rather than letting a plausible number stand in for the right one.
The other nine company-data rows split the same way. Three are things the model has not been built to carry, namely the energy mix, energy intensity by NACE sector, and waste by type. Six are disclosures no impact model could produce, covering fossil-fuel sector exposure, Global Compact and OECD violations and the processes to monitor them, gender pay gap, board diversity and controversial weapons.
That taxonomy is the useful part. A missing indicator is either a portfolio figure, a modelling decision away, or a company disclosure you have to go and get, and knowing which is which turns the table into a work list rather than a set of blanks.
Record the stake held in the holding in the workspace portfolio, under Manage holdings, and the attributed column fills, converting investee values into the per-holding format the technical standards require. In this example a 15 per cent stake attributes 810 of the 5,399 tonnes. Not everything scales that way. Intensity stays blank in that column, because a ratio is a property of the company and does not divide down with a holding. Without a stake nothing is attributed, and the page says so rather than assuming the fund owns all of it.
The table returns no overall verdict, and that is deliberate. Rows without a figure are data-quality and due-diligence items rather than failures.
Reading the sustainable investment test

Three tests, all of which must pass. For a holding valued against an alternative, the harm tests read its own footprint, never offset by the alternative, while the contribution candidates show each pathway's additional impact. On Nutris the page lists the pathways that could carry a contribution, reports three of four do-no-significant-harm limits exceeded, and names governance as the fund's own assessment. Under the default limits the holding fails the second test, so it cannot qualify. Hold that conclusion lightly for a moment, because the reason turns out to be more interesting than the verdict.
The contribution figure is a choice
The page lists the positive pathways that could carry an objective, split by the capital they mostly create, each with its value and its share of revenue. On the environmental side, avoided whey production leads at 155,000 dollars, 1.5 per cent of revenue, followed by avoided non-whey ingredient production and soil-carbon storage from changed farm practices. On the social side come payroll taxes, extra income for the farmers who supply the beans, wages, protein intake and plant-based dietary choice.
Which objective the fund pursues, and which of these pathways serve it, is the fund's call, and the page says so. It sets no contribution threshold either. SFDR prescribes no societal-value-to-revenue ratio at all, so any rule the fund applies is the fund's own, in the same way the harm limits below are.
How the figure is built matters more than the figure. For a fund whose objective is to regenerate biodiversity, payroll taxes and protein intake are out at once, whatever else they do for the world. Even avoided whey production serves the objective only in part. The Double materiality page places 88,000 dollars of its value on biodiversity and ecosystems and most of the rest on climate and pollution.
So a fund with a 1 per cent rule would see the whole pathway clear it at 1.5 per cent and its biodiversity share fall short at 0.9 per cent. Add every candidate together and the contribution multiplies and clears any such rule with room to spare. It would also mean nothing, because the regulation asks for contribution to a stated objective, not for general merit, and the page keeps the candidates apart rather than adding them up for you.
So the contribution figure is not a property of the company. It is a statement about which of a company's positive impacts serve one named objective, and it is worth exactly as much as the discipline behind the selection. It should never travel without the objective and the selection attached to it.
Where the harm sits
All four harm rules are ratios, and three of them fail at the default limits. Greenhouse gas intensity reads 533 tonnes per million dollars of revenue against a limit of 300. Monetised harm to nature reaches 71 per cent of revenue against a limit of 25, and its worst theme, water pollution, reaches 35.5 per cent against 10. Harm to people passes, its worst pathway a small loss of usable mineral intake at close to zero against a limit of 5.
The first thing to notice is that the failure has an address. Not an amber flag on an ESG dashboard, but water pollution at about 3.6 million dollars of monetised harm, and the Double materiality page traces most of the pollution harm to one pathway, the fava crop Nutris buys, at 4.1 million dollars. That is a specific and actionable thing to put to a company.
Read the ratios against the company's stage
The second thing to notice is the denominator.
Every DNSH rule here is a ratio to revenue, and Nutris has about 10.1 million dollars of it. That is a young plant-protein producer some way short of scale, and physical footprint arrives well before commercial maturity does. Fields are farmed, nutrients run off and processing runs at subscale yields long before pricing, volume and margin catch up. Measuring externalities against a small and rapidly growing revenue line will produce a high ratio almost by construction, and the same operation at three or five times the revenue would report a very different percentage without a single thing changing on the ground.
That does not make the result wrong. The page computed what it was configured to compute, and 71 per cent against a 25 per cent limit is what those limits return on this company today. But it means the result is a statement about a limit meeting an early-stage business, rather than a settled judgement about the holding. On trajectory, a company whose entire product thesis is displacing animal ingredients looks considerably more like a sustainable investment than this snapshot suggests, and a fund willing to hold companies at this stage needs limits that say so.
There are a few honest ways to handle it. Set stage-appropriate limits and record why, which is a methodology decision the fund can defend. Look at the ratio's direction across successive releases rather than its level in one year. Or use a denominator less sensitive to commercial maturity than revenue for early-stage holdings. What is not defensible is inheriting a default calibrated for large caps, applying it to a scale-up, and reporting the output as a finding.
The four limits are editable on the same page by an editor of the workspace. They are the fund's own and apply to every holding in the workspace, a limit the fund has not set shows as the module default, and emptying one restores the default. The page asks the fund to document its thresholds. They are a starting point, and the invitation to change them is explicit.
Governance stays a human judgement
The third test is a single line. The page names what the regulation asks for, sound management structures, employee relations, staff remuneration and tax compliance, and says they are not in the model and the fund assesses them itself.
Nothing there is modelled, deliberately. Those are matters of documentary evidence rather than impact pathways. What the page adds is to keep the test in view beside the other two, so that it is never quietly assumed. Until the fund has assessed it, the holding does not qualify, however the other two tests read.
What the page is for
A result with three limits exceeded looks like a dead end, and it is the most useful thing the page produces.
The failing rules are the engagement agenda. Nutris does not trip a rule because a score came back amber. It trips because monetised harm to nature reaches 71 per cent of revenue and water pollution alone reaches 35.5 per cent, both against limits the fund chose and can point to. That is a conversation with a company, a set of conditions for reassessment, a reason to look at the limits, and a documented basis for whatever gets decided.
The candidates carry the same property. A biodiversity contribution of 0.9 per cent of revenue is defensible because the objective is stated, the pathway is named and the value traces back to the model underneath. That is not available from a label or a letter grade.
And most of the file ends up in one place. The PAI coverage with its gaps marked, the contribution candidates, the harm limits and the figures behind each sit on one page of the Deck, and the governance reasoning belongs beside them in the fund's own file. Most of the work in a sustainable-investment file is not reaching the conclusion. It is being able to show, a year later, exactly how it was reached and what would change it.
Where it stops
The page screens one holding against one fund's limits. It does not classify a product, and Article 9 classification and disclosure remain the financial market participant's responsibility.
The limits are internal screening rules, not statutory limits. A complete regulatory DNSH review also has to consider the relevant PAI indicators and alignment with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Computed PAI values are model estimates rather than reported inventories, and the table labels them as proxies. Values read at a scenario year may support a forward-looking case but are not realised contribution, and the page stamps them as projected. And none of this replaces the fund's documented methodology, its legal interpretation, portfolio-level PAI calculations, product disclosures, compliance review or assurance.
Background
The Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation is the EU transparency framework for financial market participants and financial products, covering sustainability risks, adverse sustainability impacts, environmental or social characteristics and sustainable-investment objectives. It has applied since March 2021, with the disclosure templates and PAI methodologies set out in Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/1288.
Article 9 covers products with sustainable investment as their objective, and Article 2(17) sets the three conditions. The investment must contribute to an environmental or social objective, must not significantly harm another, and the investee must follow good governance practices, which the regulation frames as sound management structures, employee relations, staff remuneration and tax compliance.
That framework is being rewritten. The Commission proposed a revision in November 2025 replacing the Article 8 and Article 9 classifications with three product categories, removing entity-level disclosure obligations and repealing the current technical standards. The Council agreed its negotiating position in June 2026 and proposed the new regime apply 24 months after entry into force. Parliament has been working through its own position, and a final text is expected around the turn of 2026 and 2027, with application in 2028.
The three tests largely survive the rewrite, which is why the page is built on them. The labels may not. Confirm which regime and which technical standards apply before relying on any of this.
Try it on a holding you know
The interesting question is not whether the software agrees with your existing classification. It is whether your limits survive contact with a company you actually want to hold.
Take a position already sitting in an Article 9 product, write the objective in your own words, keep only the candidate pathways, or the parts of them, that genuinely serve it, and leave the harm limits exactly where they are. If the result matches what is in your file, you have evidence you did not have this morning. If it does not, you have found either a limit nobody calibrated or a contribution nobody quantified, and both are considerably cheaper to find now than during assurance.
Not on the platform yet? Request access and test it on a holding you know.